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1. Introduction 
 
“The changes in the economic process brought about by innovation, 
(...) we shall designate by the term Economic Evolution." 
"Capitalism is that form of private property economy in which 
innovations are carried out by means of borrowed money.” 
(Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 86 & 223). 
 
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt problems hanging over the 
European Monetary Union countries calls for an increased efficiency of public funding 
programmes. This paper contributes to the debate on the financing of firms’ innovation 
activities. 
 There are two key arguments why firms’ innovation activities should be 
subsidised: the “public good” and the “financial market failure” thesis. The former 
states that there are significant spillover effects associated with innovations, that is, the 
social return of innovation is higher than its private return. The latter relies on evidence 
that R&D expenditures and innovation activities are particularly prone to financial 
constraints (Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
 Even though the analysis of firms’ financial constraints and the extent to which 
subsidies foster firms’ R&D and innovation are two closely related lines of research, the 
link between them is rather unexplored. Which criteria should prevail when evaluating 
potential subsidy recipients? On the one hand, one might argue that, regardless of 
financial constraints, subsidies are desirable as long as they promote innovation. On the 
other, it seems sensible to say that subsidies should be aimed at financially constrained 
firms. 
 In practice, innovation subsidies have different objectives and criteria than other 
public financial support measures that strictly address financial constraints. While the 
latter is to reduce financial constraints to promote investment, growth and\or job 
creation, the former is to promote innovation. However, the point we make in this paper 
is that regardless of the ultimate policy objective, subsidies should be given to those 
firms in need. In other words, those firms that have difficulties in accessing finance, 
which we define here as financially constrained. Only then, can we argue that the 
“financial market failure” is truly being addressed. 
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 This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to explicitly analyse both the allocation 
of innovation subsidies and their role in alleviating firms’ financial constraints. It is not 
the purpose of the paper to question whether subsidies foster innovation, but rather if: a) 
subsidies are being correctly allocated to financially constrained firms; b) they 
effectively increase firms’ ability to obtain external finance.1 We argue that, in addition 
to the usual “public good” arguments behind the allocation of innovation subsidies, the 
extent to which firms are able to obtain external funding should not be overlooked. 
 The literature on firms’ financial constraints struggles to find a consistent 
methodology to measure such constraints (Carreira and Silva, 2010). Given that the 
interest of the paper lies on discerning policy implications, we employ different 
methodologies to test the robustness of our findings—namely, we resort to a) a self-
assessed measure; b) the MS index (Musso and Schiavo, 2008); c) an adaptation of the 
MS index to encompass different levels of constraints across industries (weighted MS); 
d) the HH index (Hovakimien and Hovakimien, 2009). To conduct our empirical tests, 
we use a large unbalanced panel of Portuguese firms covering the period 1996-2004. 
This dataset comprises detailed information on firms’ generic characteristics and 
balance sheets, matched with three waves of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), 
which provide additional variables on innovation, subsidies and self-assessed financial 
constraints. 
 Overall, our results question the allocation and effectiveness of subsidies in 
alleviating financial constraints of firms willing to innovate. Accordingly, these findings 
have serious implications on the design of future innovation policy actions. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews what is generally known 
about the role of innovation subsidies and the existence of firms’ financial constraints, 
as well as it formulates the main hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3 we describe the 
dataset and methodology used, while the main empirical results can be found in Section 
4. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the main findings, while Section 6 pulls the pieces 
together and concludes. 
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 As we will see in Section 2.2, there is a large body of literature showing the impact of subsides on firm’s 
innovation 
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2. Subsidies to Innovation and Financial constraints 
2.1. Measuring financial constraints  
The empirical analysis of firms’ financial constraints can essentially be traced back to 
the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988), who introduced the well-know investment to 
cash-flow sensitivity approach (hereafter ICFS). Even though this methodology is, by 
far, the most commonly employed, it has been seriously challenged both at empirical 
and theoretical levels (e.g. Alti, 2003; Coad, 2010; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; see also 
Carreira and Silva, 2010, for a survey). 
 Ever since, the empirical literature has strived to find consistent methodologies 
to measure constraints. Examples of these measures can be found in Almeida et al. 
(2004), who suggest the use of cash to cash-flow sensitivities, the Euler equation 
approach proposed by Whited (1992), different composite indexes such as those 
advanced by Lamont et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006) or Musso and Schiavo (2008) 
and, recently, firm-level cash-flow sensitivities in line with Hovakimien and 
Hovakimien (2009)—not to mention the use of proxies and, when available, credit 
ratings (e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2008) 
 Nevertheless, there are a number of advantages and disadvantages of using each 
measure (see Silva and Carreira, 2012b, for an overview). In fact, due to the nature of 
financial constraints—firm-specific, time-varying, and not a clear-cut dichotomous 
phenomenon (Musso and Schiavo, 2008)—, finding an objective and consistent 
measure of constraints may prove to be a serious challenge. As pointed by Coad (2010), 
using rather fragile methodologies (on either empirical or theoretical grounds) to derive 
strong policy conclusions is not uncommon among the empirical literature of this field. 
Accordingly, in this paper we make use of three different approaches in order to obtain 
robust results and ultimately draw relevant policy implications: a) self-assessed 
measure; b) MS index; c) HH index. 
  
5 
 
2.2. Subsidies to innovation  
There are several arguments behind policy actions in the form of public financial 
support to firms.2 Among these, the role of subsidies to innovation and those aimed at 
stimulating R&D spending, has been given particular emphasis in the last few years 
(e.g. Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Bloom et al., 2002; 
Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). 
 The main theoretical arguments for public financial support of innovation efforts 
and R&D spending (hereafter subsidies for simplicity) can be summarized in: a) the 
“public good” nature of knowledge—higher social than private returns to R&D 
investment, due to incomplete appropriability and knowledge spillovers; b) the 
“financial market failure”—R&D investments are riskier, harder to use as collateral and 
entail significant information asymmetry problems leading to financial constraints (see 
Hall and Lerner, 2010, for an overview).  
 The common departing point is the well known importance of innovation as a 
key driver of economic growth. Within this literature, we identify two different, but 
closely related lines of research. On the one hand, there is a large body of literature that 
stresses the importance of financial constraints as a barrier to R&D investment and 
innovation (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011; Savignac, 2008; Silva and Carreira, 
2012a). On the other hand, research has recently focused on whether innovation 
subsidies crowd out, or stimulate private R&D investment (David et al., 2000). Even 
though subsidies appear to have a crowding-out effect when it comes to development 
activities (Clausen, 2009), state of the art literature suggests that innovation subsidies do 
have an additionality effect upon R&D expenditure (e.g. Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; 
Czarnitzki and Bento, 2011)—particularly with respect to research activities, that are 
usually found to be more affected by financial constraints (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). The 
existence of common points between these two lines of research seems worthwhile 
exploring.  
  
                                                           
2
 Within a policy perspective, it seems worthwhile mentioning the increased interest, within the European 
Union, to address the financing problems SMEs. Examples can be found in. the recent package of almost 
€1 billion to finance such firms—European Commission press release IP/11/900 under the FP7 policy—, 
or the recent ECB efforts to unveil the extent to which firms are financially constrained—Survey on the 
access to finance of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE).  
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2.3. Main Hypotheses 
The question that we tackle in this paper is however slightly different. Rather than 
analysing the effect of either financial constraints or subsidies on R&D spending and 
innovation activity, we focus on whether subsidies are allocated to financially 
constrained firms and if they effectively reduce such constraints.  
 Since financial resources are not unlimited, notoriously in the present days, 
choosing where to allocate public funding is crucial. Accordingly, suppose that there are 
two firms that only differ in their ability to raise external funds. While one is financially 
constrained the other is not. Additionally, let us assume that scarce public resources 
force the policymaker to finance only one firm. 
 On the one hand, the role of lack of external finance as a barrier to innovate is 
well documented in the literature. On the other hand, recent empirical evidence suggests 
that subsidies have an additionality effect upon R&D expenditures and increase the 
probability to innovate (Section 2.2). If we employ the usual argument for public 
financial support of innovation based on the latter findings, funding will be channelled 
to that firm that is expected to have a higher probability to innovate. 
 However, suppose that both face the same technological opportunity but, due to 
information asymmetry problems, the unconstrained firm is a subsidy recipient, while 
the constrained one is not. Evidently, the latter will not be able to innovate. What if the 
policymaker choses to finance the constrained firm, instead of the unconstrained one? In 
this situation, both will be able to innovate. The reason lies on the very fact that without 
public funding the constrained firm will never innovate, while the unconstrained firm is 
always able to obtain external funding (by definition). 
 In fact, it seems sensible to argue that, within firms that want to innovate, public 
funding should be aimed at those that otherwise would not be able to finance such 
innovations (financially constrained firms). Accordingly, one should expect that the 
probability of a firm receiving subsidies should undoubtedly depend on its level of 
financial constraints. If that is not the case, then this form of public financial support 
may not be that different from the usual sources of private external finance. This 
discussion leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. Subsidies are allocated to financially constrained firms. 
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 Furthermore, it is apparent that subsidies directly increase firms’ financial 
capacity in the short term. However, when it comes to information asymmetries and 
firms’ access to external funds, as well as long term financing ability, the effect is not as 
clear. It is now time to ask ourselves whether subsidies play a role in reducing 
information asymmetries, therefore enabling firms to obtain external finance in 
subsequent periods. In other words, should subsidies work as a quality stamp, or do they 
suggest to investors that recipients are not viable?  
 On the one hand, if public funding enables firms to engage in patenting activity 
(Audretsch et al 2012), increases firms’ economic prospects and if it signals quality to 
private investors (Kleer, 2010), subsidies may well reduce financial constraints in the 
long term (Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). On the other hand, such subsidies 
may lead to a relative inertia of firms—that may eventually become subsidy dependent, 
illustrated by “subsidy persistence” found in the literature (e.g. Hussinger, 2008)—
without necessarily improving firms’ ability to raise private external funds. 
Accordingly, it is the aim of this paper to test whether: 
Hypothesis 2. Subsidies reduce firms’ financial constraints. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We construct a unique dataset from the combination of the three different data sources 
provided by the Portuguese national Statistical Office (INE)—Ficheiro de Unidades 
Estatísticas (FUE), Inquérito às Empresas Harmonizado (IEH) and Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). As a result, we are able to construct a panel comprising 
variables on firms’ financial status (IEH) and generic characteristics (FUE), further 
enriching the innovation information on CISs surveyed firms. Accordingly, our final 
dataset is composed by three CIS waves, corresponding to the years 1997, 2000 and 
2004 (CIS 2, 3 and 4, respectively), comprising 8,132 observations. This information is 
appended by an unbalanced panel (FUE and IEH) of the respective 7,079 firms for the 
period 1996-2004, resulting in 30,177 observations available (see Table A1, Appendix).  
 The use of CIS is crucial to the analysis of public financial support to firms’ 
innovation activity. Among other variables, it contains valuable information on 
innovation, R&D expenses, subsidies to innovation and, remarkably, a direct measure of 
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financial constraints to innovate—see the Appendix for a detailed description of the 
variables used. 
3.2. Measures of financial constraints 
Due to the problems associated with measuring financial constraints, we make use of 
different methodologies to analyse the nexus between innovation subsidies and firms’ 
constraints. First, we construct a direct measure from the information on firms’ 
perception of constraints—available in the CIS survey. Second, we employ the 
approach suggested by Hovakimien and Hovakimien (2009), hereafter HH index. 
Finally, we resort to the methodology proposed by Musso and Schiavo (2008), hereafter 
MS index. 
3.2.1. Direct measure 
The first measure employed to assess firms’ financial constraints results from a survey 
question regarding the extent to which firms perceive that the lack of external finance 
significantly hampered their innovation activity (see the Appendix B for further detail). 
The use of firms’ self-evaluation of financial constraints has a number of advantages 
and disadvantages that we summarize as follows. 
 The main advantage of using this measure results from the fact that firms are the 
best informed agents with respect to the quality of their investment projects. Therefore 
one should expect that investment opportunities (a crucial problem in typical measures 
of constraints) are already taken into account in firms’ responses. 3  However, the 
subjective nature of the self-assessed variable means that potential biases, resulting from 
individuals’ perception, may exist. As an example, we might have respondents that feel 
that their firm is highly financially constrained, when it actually is much less 
constrained than another firm reporting a low level of constraints.4 Furthermore, it is 
worthwhile noticing that the qualitative nature of the underlying question results in an 
ordinal variable, which requires the appropriate non-linear estimation techniques. 
                                                           
3
 Note that deliberate missreporting should not be an issue since the data obtained from these surveys is 
confidential. 
4
 Some studies overcome this problem by using data on the credit requested and effectively granted (e.g. 
Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012; Russo and Rossi, 2001), however we do not have access to such 
information. 
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 Even though we do not have information on subsidy amounts, we are able to 
extract (from the CIS surveys) a binary variable that indicates whether or not a firm 
received subsidies to innovation. It also seems worthwhile mentioning that this variable 
results from a much more objective underlying question than, for example, the survey’s 
question on firms’ self-assessed financial constraints. While in the former firms are 
asked if they have received public funding, the latter requires that firms reveal their 
perception on how difficult it is to obtain external finance—carries a significant amount 
of subjectivity. 
3.2.2. HH index 
Alternatively, we also resort to the HH index that avoids the subjectivity and non-
linearity problems of our direct measure. This index is an indirect measure that picks the 
firm-specific relationship between investment and cash-flow, in the light of the well 
known approach based on ICFS, originally proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988).  
 The HH index compares the time average of investment weighted by cash-flow, 
against the simple time-average of investment. Accordingly, investment receives a 
higher weight in years when cash-flow is higher, capturing the sensitivity of investment 
with respect to variations of cash-flow. Therefore, if a firm invests more (less) in years 
with higher cash flow, the HH index will yield positive (negative) values. The reverse is 
also true. The index is constructed in the following way: 
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where CF is cash-flow, I is investment, K is total assets, n the number of annual (t) 
observations for firm i. However, in order to avoid extreme negative values, all cash-
flow observations with negative values are set to zero.5  
 Even though this measure captures firm-level heterogeneity of financial 
constraints, these are assumed to be constant over time. Therefore, this approach does 
not account for the possibility that the same firm faces different states of constraints 
along the timeline (see Cleary, 1999; Hubbard, 1998). Additionally, this methodology 
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 This is the same procedure as in Hovakimien and Hovakimien (2009).We also remove firms for which 
investment level is only observed once. 
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fails to control for investment opportunities and other variables affecting investment, as 
well as it does not explore marginal effects (see D’Espallier et al., 2009, for a critique).6 
Finally, it assumes that ICFS correctly identifies firms’ financial constraints. 
3.2.3. MS index 
As we have pointed out in Section 2.1, a good measure of financial constraints should 
accommodate the fact that these are both firm-specific and time-varying. In this line, 
Musso and Schiavo (2008) propose an index that allows for individual and temporal 
heterogeneity of constraints. The strategy is to rank firms (according to proxies of 
financial constraints) in a certain class (e.g. industry) that is believed to be reasonably 
homogeneous. Therefore, one can build a score of constraints based on the relative 
rankings of a given number of variables for a certain firm, within a certain class. The 
motivation for using homogeneous classes is to account for specificities that may affect 
the relationship of the proxies and the genuine level of constraints. As a result, for a 
given firm, higher values of the MS index will reflect a higher level of constraints 
relative to the class mean. 
 The procedure takes two steps. First, we identify a number of proxies of 
financial constraints.7  Second, for each of these variables, we compute the relative 
position (rank) of each firm to the corresponding industry mean. As an example, if a 
firm is very old and large relative to the industry mean, it is considered not to be 
constrained. If the reverse it’s true, then such firm is assigned as constrained. Third, to 
allow for different degrees of constraints, we build intermediate levels based on the 
individual rankings—we create five distinct levels according to the quintiles of the 
relative distribution of each proxy. Finally, we collapse the rankings from all the proxies 
into a single score of financial constraints for each firm-year.8 
                                                           
6
 The tests based on Fazzari et al. (1998) rely on the on the assumption that, holding investment 
opportunities constant, investment responds positively to cash-flow if a firms is financially constrained 
(no sensitivity should be found for unconstrained firms). 
7
 The index is constructed based on the following variables: size (total assets), profitability, liquidity 
(current asset over current liabilities), cash flow generating ability (the maximum amount of resources 
that a firm can devote to self-financing), solvency (own funds over total liabilities), trade credit over total 
assets, repaying ability (financial debt over cash flow). To avoid extreme values, all variables are 
winsorized at the 1% level. 
8
 We collapsed the different variable rankings by summing them over each firm (obtain a score) and then 
are rescale the index to 1-10, using the deciles of the score distribution. 
11 
 
 We should note however that there are two major drawbacks when using this 
approach. First, if there are non-linearities in the relationship between the proxy and the 
effective level of constraints, the final score will misrepresent the level of constraints. In 
this situation, nothing guarantees that the difference between a firm scoring 1 and 2 is 
the same as the difference between the levels 2 and 3. As a result, the score of 
constraints must be analysed as an ordinal variable, which has significant implications 
in the choice of the estimation procedure. Second, the disaggregation in relatively 
homogeneous classes of firms might entail considerable difficulties when comparing 
firms across classes. As an example, if the index is built on relative rankings for each 
industry, and if the less constrained firms in industry A is more constrained than the 
most constrained firm in industry B, one can not compare the scores of firms in 
industries A and B because of different benchmarks.9 
 Nevertheless, we are able to overcome these difficulties by using the appropriate 
non-linear regression techniques, as well as by weighting each firm score by the 
industry’s average level of financial constraints. To obtain industry average levels of 
financial constraints, we estimate (for each industry) the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, 
in line with the methodology suggested by Almeida et al. (2004) and the findings in 
Silva and Carreira (2010). 
3.3. Estimation strategy 
The analysis of the nexus between innovation subsidies and firms’ financial constraints 
reveals a number of difficulties associated with the non-linear nature of the variables of 
interest (Table 1), as well as with endogeneity problems. 
 Even though the usual problem related to survey artificial correlation between 
variables of interest may not be as serious due to the objectivity of our subsidy variable, 
there are nevertheless reasons to suspect of endogeneity. Firstly, if a firm is financially 
constrained, it might be seen as a potentially more appropriate target for public policy, 
as well as there is a higher probability that it applies for subsidies (we do not have data 
on subsidy requests). Secondly, endogeneity may be present due to potentially 
correlated unobservables. Among others, we should refer to public policy goals and 
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 Note that firms operating in some industries are, on average, more constrained than firms in other 
industries (Silva and Carreira, 2010). 
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budgets, firms’ applications for subsidy programs and the quality of the underlying 
project (Jaffe, 2002; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). 
 
Table 1. Variables measuring financial constraints 
Measure Nature Comments 
Direct Ordinal 
Subjective 
Firm-specific 
Varies across waves 
HH index Continuous 
Assumes ICFS holds 
Firm-specifc 
Time invariant 
MS index Ordinal 
Assumes same level of constraints across industries 
Firm-specific 
Varies across years 
Weighted MS index 
Ordinal 
(assumed continuous) 
Firm-specific 
Varies across years 
 
 
 The combination of non-linear estimation techniques that accommodate binary 
and either ordinal or continuous variables, as well as possible endogeneity issues, result 
in the use of distinct estimation techniques, outlined as follows. (We also report the 
estimation results for the corresponding specifications without controlling for 
endogeneity.) 
 Finally, if the existence of financial constraints increases the probability of a 
firm being subsidy recipient, and if subsidies reduce financial constraints, it seems 
sensible to make use of the panel structure of our data and introduce lags (balance sheet 
variables as well as a specification with lagged CIS variables). 
3.3.1. The probability of receiving subsidies 
While our subsidy variable is dichotomous, both the MS index and direct measure of 
constraints are of ordinal nature (Table 1). Therefore, in order to investigate the impact 
of financial constraints upon the probability that a firm receives subsidies, we specify a 
model of two latent simultaneous equations as follows: 
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where SUB is the binary indicator of whether a firm received subsidies, FC is a measure 
of financial constraints, while SUB* and FC* are the corresponding unobserved latent 
variables.10 
 Additionally, the vector X1 includes a number of variables that may influence the 
probability of a firm receiving subsidies: size (SIZE), age (AGE), percentage of R&D 
employees (RD_WORK), market share (MKTS), exports (EXP), percentage of foreign 
capital (FOR_K), cooperation with other firms and institutions (COOP), share of 
subsidies by industry (SUB%I) and region (SUB%R), registry of patents (PATENT) and 
intangibles (INTANG). 
 Furthermore, in the vector X2 we include the usual determinants of FC. This 
equation explains financial constraints through the combination of both firms' 
characteristics and financial variables: firm size (SIZE); firm age (AGE); 2-digit 
industry dummies (CAE rev 2.1); percentage of public and foreign capital (PUB_K and 
FOR_K, respectively); sales growth (∆Y); cash stocks (CS); cash-flow (CF); leverage 
(LEV); debt and equity issuances (ISS); changes in interest paid (∆INT); returns on 
financial investments (R_FinI); exports (EXP); market share (MKTS). All these 
variables are obtained from balance sheets. Therefore, we use the first lag of these 
variables to account for the CIS wave span and reduce artificial survey correlation. 
Exceptions are PUB_K, FOR_K, ∆Y, ISS and ∆NWC , since they either do not have 
sufficient annual variation, or their construction is based on the previous period (would 
imply the loss of all CIS2 observations).11 
                                                           
10
 We also test the corresponding probit, where we do not control for the possible endogeneity of financial 
constraints. In this case the ordinal FC variable is collapsed into a binary indicator. Additionally, we use a 
specification with the wave lag of financial constraints, even though we have to drop the HH index 
measure due to lack of time variability by construction (Section 3.1.2). 
11
 See the Appendix for further detail on the construction of variables 
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 We further extend the model to allow FC outcomes to be ordinal and estimate 
the corresponding simultaneous equations ordered probit model—see Greene and 
Hensher, 2010, pp. 222 for details and Sajaia, 2008, for STATA implementation.12 
Finally, if there are no omitted or unobservable variables that affect simultaneously SUB 
and FC (ρ=0), we can estimate the equations separately.13 
 However, some of the measures of financial constraints are continuous (Table 
1). Accordingly we drop the latent variable specification and estimate their impact upon 
the dichotomous subsidy variable using an instrumental variables extension of a probit 
regression. The instruments used are those corresponding to variables in the vector X2. 
This is the case of the HH index, as well as the MS index weighted by industry cash to 
cash-flow sensitivity. With respect to the latter, even though it is a weighted ordinal 
variable, we assume it to be continuous. Eventual non-linearity problems are minor due 
to an extensively large number of different values and since interest lies in the signal 
rather than the amplitude of the impact. Formally, we assume that the values of this 
ordinal variable approximate those of the unobserved latent continuous variable 
(FC≈FC*). 
3.3.2. The impact of subsidies on financial constraints 
In order to analyse the impact of subsidies upon firms’ financial constraints (ordinal 
measures), we use the same estimation approach as in the previous section. 
Accordingly, we specify a simultaneous equations probit model (with the corresponding 
latent variables specification), that we further extend to the ordered probit case. The 
same logical consistency constraint applies and we also normalize the variance of the 
errors. Therefore, we simultaneously estimate the following model: 
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 Note that since the estimation of marginal effects (in this case) is of rather hard computation and above 
all interpretation we refrain from estimating them. Nevertheless, interest lies in the signal rather than on 
the magnitude of the effects. 
13
 This parameter can be used to test exogeneity. 
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where the vectors X1 and X2 include the same determinants described in the preceding 
section. Again, if there are no omitted or unobservable variables that affect 
simultaneously SUB and FC ( 0=ς ), we can estimate the equations separately.14 
 For the case of continuous financial constraints measures (HH and weighted MS 
indexes), we specify a simple treatment effects model to estimate the impact of an 
endogenous binary treatment (SUB) on our fully observed dependent variable (FC):  
1112 vSUBXFC ++= αβ , (5) 
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 The corresponding models, that assume endogeneity away, are also estimated. 
Namely, we estimate an ordered probit (for ordinal FC) and regular OLS (for 
continuous FC). 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
4.1.1. The different measures of financial constraints 
As it is described in Table 2, there is a remarkable number of firms that face financial 
constraints. While only 56% of firms report not to be constrained, the HH index is 
higher than zero for 54% of the observed firms, suggesting the presence of constraints. 
With respect to the MS and weighted MS indexes, this picture is not as clear because 
there is no objective threshold distinguishing firms between constrained and 
unconstrained. Nonetheless, there is a noteworthy number of firms in the higher 
rankings of the index. 
 Additionally, Table 2 shows a positive association between the majority of 
measures of financial constraints (Spearman rank correlation coefficient). Even though 
the HH index appears not to move in the same direction as other variables, the 
remaining measures are positively correlated. Nevertheless, the correlation coefficients 
are rather low, reflecting the distinct methodologies employed. 
  
                                                           
14
 As previously pointed, this parameter can be used to test exogeneity. 
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Table 2. Measures of financial constraints 
Ordinal Measures Continuous Measures 
FC Frequency Percentage Weighted MS  
0 1,982 55.58 Min 0.046 
1 446 12.51 25% 0.318 
2 551 15.45 50% 0.418 
3 587 16.46 75% 0.568 
Total 3,566 100 Max 1.875 
   Μ 0.457 
   Σ 0.223 
   Observations 3303 
     
MS index   HH index  
1 678 20.51 Min -6.666 
2 444 13.43 25% -0.001 
3 278 8.41 50% 0.000 
4 307 9.29 75% 0.001 
5 295 8.92 Max 3.415 
6 286 8.65 Μ -0.005 
7 261 7.89 Σ 0.207 
8 346 10.47 HH>0 1692 
9 266 8.05  (54.4%) 
10 145 4.39 Observations 3110 
Total 3,306 100   
     
Spearman correlation coefficients 
 FC MS index Weighted MS HH index 
FC 1.0000    
MS índex 0.1626* 1.0000   
Weighted MS 0.0736* 0.5663* 1.0000  
HH index -0.0014 -0.0255 -0.0488 1.0000 
Notes: Brief description and Spearman correlation coefficients of the different variables used 
to measure financial constraints. Correlation coefficients are consistent with Kendall’s τ. 
 
4.1.2. Subsidies and the different measures of constraints 
As we can see from Table 3, while 44% of firms report financial constraints (16% 
reporting high levels of constraints), only 12% are subsidised. Of the highly constrained 
firms, only 14% receive subsidies, whereas of those that report no constraints, 10% still 
obtains subsidies. Additionally, of firms that reported the absence of constraints, 25% 
receive subsidies in the subsequent period. Conversely, 20% of subsidised firms in one 
period continue to report the highest level of constraints in the following period (only 
39% reports not to be constrained). These descriptive statistics provide the first hint that 
our hypotheses 1 and 2 are questionable. 
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Table 3. Frequencies of FC and SUB: Self-assessed levels of financial constraints 
          
 	 0 1 Total 	 0 1 Total 	 0 1 Total 
Frequency 0 1,781 201 1,982 0 275 94 369 0 214 53 267 
SUB %  89.86 10.14 100  74.53 25.47 100  80.15 19.85 100 
FC %  56.68 47.41 55.58  65.79 68.61 66.49  48.09 39.26 46.03 
Total%  49.94 5.64 55.58  49.55 16.94 66.49  36.90 9.14 46.03 
             
Frequency 1 393 53 446 1 42 9 51 1 56 24 80 
SUB %  88.12 11.88 100  82.35 17.65 100  70.00 30.00 100 
FC %  12.51 12.50 12.51  10.05 6.57 9.19  12.58 17.78 13.79 
Total%  11.02 1.49 12.51  7.57 1.62 9.19  9.66 4.14 13.79 
             
Frequency 2 462 89 551 2 45 11 56 2 73 31 104 
SUB %  83.85 16.15 100  80.36 19.64 100  70.19 29.81 100 
FC %  14.70 20.99 15.45  10.77 8.03 10.09  16.40 22.96 17.93 
Total%  12.96 2.50 15.45  8.11 1.98 10.09  12.59 5.34 17.93 
             
Frequency 3 506 81 587 3 56 23 79 3 102 27 129 
SUB %  86.20 13.80 100  70.89 29.11 100  79.07 20.93 100 
FC %  16.10 19.10 16.46  13.40 16.79 14.23  22.92 20.00 22.24 
Total%  14.19 2.27 16.46  10.09 4.14 14.23  17.59 4.66 22.24 
             
Frequency Total 3,142 424 3,566 Total 418 137 555 Total 445 135 580 
SUB %  88.11 11.89 100  75.32 24.68 100  76.72 23.28 100 
FC %  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100 
Total%  88.11 11.89 100  75.32 24.68 100  76.72 23.28 100 
Notes: Frequencies of financial constraints (rows) and subsidies (columns). SUB % (FC %) are relative frequencies within rows (columns) of each cell. For the ordinal 
FC variable, higher values correspond to higher reported constraints (zero for absence of constraints). We additionally compare current (w) values of FC and SUB with 
the corresponding CIS wave lagged values (w-1). 
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 This picture does not change if, instead of a subjective self-assessed variable, we 
use the MS index to measure financial constraints (Table 4). In fact, while 15% of 
unconstrained firms (lower MS index rank) are subsidised, only 12% of firms in the 
highest rank of constraints receive subsidies. Furthermore, of unconstrained firms in one 
period, 22% received subsidies in the following one. In this line, the fact that none (0%) 
of those firms found to be highly constrained in the preceding period received any sort 
of subsidy in the next period comes up as a striking number. When it comes to the 
effects of subsidies, if we group firms in the three higher ranks of the index (levels 8-
10), we find that 24% of previously subsidised firms continue to face severe financial 
constraints. 
 With respect to the continuous measures of constraints, we test whether the 
distribution of such variables for subsidy recipients dominates that of non-recipient ones 
(Table 5). We find that non-subsidised firms have a higher probability to take on higher 
values of the weighted MS index with respect to the subsidised firms. In other words, 
non-recipients are in general more financially constrained. The same is not true when it 
comes to the HH index. In fact, even if we can not reject the equality of distributions, 
the negative sign associated with the Fligner-Policello test suggests that, using this 
measure, subsidised firms are in general more financially constrained. 
 Finally, we compare the distributions of the main variables of interest for the 
subsample of firms that do not receive subsidies, against those that do (Table 6). The 
typical subsidy recipient in our dataset is larger, more export driven, employs a larger 
share of personnel devoted to R&D, has a larger share of intangible assets, registers 
patents, cooperates with other private or public institutions and usually belongs to an 
industry that is more prone to receive subsidies. 15  In terms of industrial activity, 
subsidies are essentially given to manufacturing firms (73.11%), with a dominant 
presence of firms in textiles (12.5%), electric, optic and other equipment (11.79%) and 
chemicals (9.91%). 
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 If we compare the same variables, with respect to their values in the preceding CIS wave, the 
interpretation of results remains unchanged except for firm exporting behavior. Subsidy recipient firms 
exported less in the past. 
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Table 4. Frequencies of FC and SUB: MS index 
            
 	 0 1 Total 	 0 1 Total 	 0 1 Total 
Freq. 1 576 102 678  1 146 40 186  1 124 27 151  
SUB %  84.96 15.04 100   78.49 21.51 100   82.12 17.88 100  
FC %  20.19 22.52 20.51   34.03 30.08 33.10   26.16 19.29 24.59  
Total%  17.42 3.09 20.51   25.98 7.12 33.10   20.20 4.40 24.59  
             Freq. 2 383 61 444  2 65 21 86  2 55 13 68  
SUB %  86.26 13.74 100   75.58 24.42 100   80.88 19.12 100  
FC %  13.42 13.47 13.43   15.15 15.79 15.30   11.60 9.29 11.07  
Total%  11.58 1.85 13.43   11.57 3.74 15.30   8.96 2.12 11.07  
             Freq. 3 243 35 278  3 32 22 54  3 47 9 56  
SUB %  87.41 12.59 100   59.26 40.74 100   83.93 16.07 100  
FC %  8.52 7.73 8.41   7.46 16.54 9.61   9.92 6.43 9.12  
Total%  7.35 1.06 8.41   5.69 3.91 9.61   7.65 1.47 9.12  
             Freq. 4 266 41 307  4 47 12 59  4 42 12 54  
SUB %  86.64 13.36 100   79.66 20.34 100   77.78 22.22 100  
FC %  9.32 9.05 9.29   10.96 9.02 10.50   8.86 8.57 8.79  
Total%  8.05 1.24 9.29   8.36 2.14 10.50   6.84 1.95 8.79  
             Freq. 5 242 53 295  5 37 12 49  5 48 14 62  
SUB %  82.03 17.97 100   75.51 24.49 100   77.42 22.58 100  
FC %  8.48 11.70 8.92   8.62 9.02 8.72   10.13 10.00 10.10  
Total%  7.32 1.60 8.92   6.58 2.14 8.72   7.82 2.28 10.10  
             Freq. 6 248 38 286  6 29 11 40  6 41 12 53  
SUB %  86.71 13.29 100   72.50 27.50 100   77.36 22.64 100  
FC %  8.69 8.39 8.65   6.76 8.27 7.12   8.65 8.57 8.63  
Total%  7.50 1.15 8.65   5.16 1.96 7.12   6.68 1.95 8.63  
             Freq. 7 226 35 261  7 28 5 33  7 28 19 47  
SUB %  86.59 13.41 100   84.85 15.15 100   59.57 40.43 100  
FC %  7.92 7.73 7.89   6.53 3.76 5.87   5.91 13.57 7.65  
Total%  6.84 1.06 7.89   4.98 0.89 5.87   4.56 3.09 7.65  
             Freq. 8 310 36 346  8 22 10 32  8 27 16 43  
SUB %  89.60 10.40 100   68.75 31.25 100   62.79 37.21 100  
FC %  10.87 7.95 10.47   5.13 7.52 5.69   5.70 11.43 7.00  
Total%  9.38 1.09 10.47   3.91 1.78 5.69   4.40 2.61 7.00  
             Freq. 9 231 35 266  9 16 0 16  9 40 8 48  
SUB %  86.84 13.16 100   100 0.00 100   83.33 16.67 100  
FC %  8.10 7.73 8.05   3.73 0.00 2.85   8.44 5.71 7.82  
Total%  6.99 1.06 8.05   2.85 0.00 2.85   6.51 1.30 7.82  
             Freq. 10 128 17 145  10 7 0 7  10 22 10 32  
SUB %  88.28 11.72 100   100 0.00 100   68.75 31.25 100  
FC %  4.49 3.75 4.39   1.63 0.00 1.25   4.64 7.14 5.21  
Total%  3.87 0.51 4.39   1.25 0.00 1.25   3.58 1.63 5.21  
             Freq. Tot. 2,853 453 3,306  Tot. 429 133 562  Tot. 474 140 614  
SUB %  86.30 13.70 100   76.33 23.67 100   77.20 22.80 100  
FC %  100 100 100   100 100 100   100 100 100  
Total%  86.30 13.70 100  76.33 23.67 100  77.20 22.80 100  
Notes: Frequencies of financial constraints (rows) and subsidies (columns). SUB % (FC %) are relative 
frequencies within rows (columns) of each cell. For the ordinal FC variable, higher values correspond to 
higher reported constraints (MS index methodology). We additionally compare current (w) values of FC 
and SUB with the corresponding CIS wave lagged values (w-1). 
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Table 5. Comparison of distributions: Weighted MS and HH index 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D) Fligner-Policello (U) 
Measures (1) (2) 
Weighted MS: 0.136 5.605 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
HH index 0.045 -0.571 
 (0.395) (0.568) 
Notes: We test the equality of distributions of financial constraints between subsidised 
and non-subsidised firms. The values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D) and Fligner–
Policello (U) statistics are reported in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The 
associated P-values are in parentheses. Rejection of the null means that the two 
distributions are stochastic different. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of subsidy recipient vs non-recipient firms 
 Means and Standard Deviations Nonparametric tests 
 SUB=0 SUB=1 K-S (D) F-P (U) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SIZE 4.665 5.304 0.227 -10.254 
 (1.168) (1.268) [0.000] [0.000] 
AGE 3.018 3.105 0.085 -2.530 
 (0.716) (0.746) [0.007] [0.011] 
FOR_K 0.679 0.764 0.127 -1.870 
 (0.826) (0.751) [0.000] [0.062] 
RD_WORK 0.133 0.611 0.192 -2.793 
 (0.526) (1.162) [0.000] [0.005] 
COOP 0.105 0.524 0.418 -6.036 
 (0.307) (0.500) [0.000] [0.000] 
EXP 0.266 0.361 0.204 -6.026 
 (0.512) (0.516) [0.000] [0.000] 
SUB%I 0.038 0.166 0.546 -27.287 
 (0.067) (0.161) [0.000] [0.000] 
SUB%R 38.429 38.786 0.108 0.001 
 (44.150) (38.818) [0.000] [0.999] 
MKTS 0.120 0.125 0.063 -1.994 
 (0.179) (0.169) [0.092] [0.046] 
PATENT 0.221 0.481 0.233 -3.610 
 (0.558) (0.670) [0.000] [0.000] 
INTANG 0.034 0.055 0.257 -11.715 
 (0.075) (0.084) [0.000] [0.000] 
     
Observations 3,142 424   
Notes: Comparison of main explanatory variables between recipient and non-recipient firms (columns 1 
and 2). Mean values and standard deviations in parenthesis. The values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D) and 
Fligner–Policello (U) statistics are reported in columns (3) and (4), respectively. The associated P-values 
are in brackets. Rejection of the null means that the two distributions are stochastic different. 
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Table 7. Subsidy allocation: exogenous financial constraints. 
Measure Direct MS HH 
Type 	
 Original Weighted ICFS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC 0.107 0.008 -0.104 0.551** 
 (0.083) (0.015) (0.180) (0.236) 
SIZE 0.069** 0.085** 0.084** 0.082** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
AGE 0.078 0.054 0.050 0.023 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) 
FOR_K -0.013 -0.038 -0.046 -0.048 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) 
RD_WORK 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
COOP 0.969*** 0.971*** 0.975*** 0.980*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) 
EXP 0.171** 0.182** 0.163** 0.168** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) 
SUB%I 6.941*** 7.125*** 7.140*** 7.148*** 
 (0.558) (0.569) (0.571) (0.577) 
SUB%R -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MKTS -0.906*** -0.998*** -1.015*** -0.887*** 
 (0.290) (0.285) (0.294) (0.269) 
PATENT 0.084 0.098* 0.094* 0.091 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) 
INTANG 0.177 0.327 0.368 0.279 
 (0.391) (0.402) (0.400) (0.414) 
     
Observations 3,566 3,306 3,303 3,110 
Log-likelihood -434.8 -425.8 -425.6 -410.3 
Notes: Estimates of a probit regression of subsidies on different types of financial constraints: self-assed 
ordinal variable collapsed into binary (column 1); MS index and industry weighted MS index (columns 2 
and 3, respectively); HH index (column 4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
 
4.2. Subsidy allocation 
As we can see in Tables 7 and 8, the extent to which a firm is financially constrained 
appears to have no impact upon the probability that it receives public financial support. 
While in Table 7 we report our estimates that do not account for the possibility of 
financial constraints being endogenously determined, the results in Table 8 explicitly 
account and test for such possibility. A striking result that is robust to different 
measures and estimations strategies is the absence of a statistically significant impact (at 
the 10% level) of financial constraints upon subsidies. The only exception is found with 
respect to the use of the HH index in an exogeneity scenario (Table 7, column 4), where 
financial constraints are found to increase the probability of a firm receiving subsidies 
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(statistically significant at the 5% level). Additionally, when we introduce a time 
dimension (the CIS waves, Table C1 in Appendix), the extent to which a firm is 
financially constrained ex-ante does not affect the probability that it is subsidy recipient. 
As a consequence, these results lead to the rejection of our hypothesis 1 that subsidies 
are being correctly allocated to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, there is no 
clear evidence suggesting that financial constraints are endogenous since we can not 
reject that the equations determining subsidies and financial constraints are independent 
(ρ=0). 
 
Table 8. Subsidy allocation: endogenous financial constraints. 
Measure Direct MS HH 
Type FC Original Weighted ICFS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC 0.021 0.082 0.388 3.258 
 (0.251) (0.052) (1.157) (3.862) 
SIZE 0.062* 0.101*** 0.081** 0.078* 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041) 
AGE 0.056 0.037 0.050 0.030 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.063) (0.046) 
FOR_K 0.178** 0.257*** 0.224 0.137 
 (0.077) (0.084) (0.150) (0.106) 
RD_WORK -0.008 -0.015 -0.032 -0.054 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) 
COOP 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.176*** 0.136 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.100) 
EXP 0.987*** 0.964*** 0.970*** 0.814* 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.105) (0.476) 
SUB%I 6.795*** 6.887*** 6.994*** 5.904* 
 (0.559) (0.579) (0.590) (3.291) 
SUB%R -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
MKTS -0.926*** -0.853*** -0.969*** -0.804* 
 (0.299) (0.305) (0.312) (0.444) 
PATENT 0.075 0.084 0.095 0.059 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.065) (0.072) 
INTANG 0.133 0.248 0.219 0.255 
 (0.414) (0.415) (0.490) (0.388) 
     
ρ 0.016 -0.225 -0.115 -0.621 
 (0.353) (0.158) (0.255) (1.011) 
     
Observations 3,180 3,059 3,056 2,956 
Log-likelihood -2108 -3599 -224.9 -89.80 
Notes: Estimates of simultaneous equations specification in line with equation (3) using different 
measures of financial constraints: self-assed (column 1); MS index and industry weighted MS index 
(columns 2 and 3, respectively); HH index (column 4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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4.3. Subsidy efficiency 
To test whether subsidies reduces firms’ financial constraints, we follow the estimation 
strategy described in Section 3.3.2—in Table 9 we assume that subsidies are exogenous, 
while in Table 10 we have endogenous subsidies case. Both specifications yield 
puzzling results. Regardless the measure of financial constraints used, we do not find 
that subsidies mitigate such constraints. On the contrary, we find a positive and 
statistically significant impact of subsidies upon the level of constraints. The only 
exception is found when we measure financial constraints through our weighted MS 
index. Using this approach, there is no statistically significant impact of subsidies on 
firms’ constraints (Tables 9 and 10, column 3). Furthermore, using a specification with 
CIS wave lagged effects, there is no evidence that firms that receive subsidies are ex 
post financially constrained (Table C2 in Appendix). These results lead to a clear 
rejection of our hypothesis 2 that subsidies alleviate financial constraints. Finally, using 
a specification that accounts for the possible endogeneity of subsidies seems sensible. In 
fact, except for our weighted MS index, we reject that the equations governing subsidies 
and financial constraints are independent ( 0≠ς ). 
5. Discussion 
The underlying question throughout this paper is whether one should support firms’ 
innovation activity regardless of their ability to obtain external funding. As our findings 
in Section 4.2 suggest, the extent to which firms are financially constrained is not taken 
into consideration when allocating public funding—rejection of hypothesis 1. This 
result is robust to different approaches used to identify and measure constraints. 
Therefore one might well be subsidising firms that do not necessarily require public 
funding to undertake their innovation projects, since they are able to obtain external 
funds privately (by definition of unconstrained firms). Conversely, constrained firms 
that are not subsidy recipients will hardly be able to innovate since they lack financial 
resources. The worrying fact is that, as presented in Section 4.1, these firms are not so 
few. 
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Table 9. Subsidy efficiency: exogenous subsidies. 
Measure Direct MS HH 
Type FC Original Weighted ICFS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUB 0.174** 0.142** -0.008 0.008* 
 (0.074) (0.068) (0.016) (0.005) 
SIZE -0.050** -0.124*** -0.012** -0.001 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.005) (0.001) 
AGE 0.051 0.029 -0.026*** -0.007 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) 
PUB_K -0.002 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOR_K -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ -0.121 0.384*** 0.021 -0.010 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.018) (0.011) 
CS -1.018***    
 (0.283)    
CF -0.662**    
 (0.318)    
LEV 0.226**   -0.103 
 (0.108)   (0.072) 
ISS -0.375** -0.706*** -0.061** 0.034 
 (0.170) (0.137) (0.027) (0.043) 
∆ 12.341*** -3.489 -0.512 1.418 
 (3.727) (3.551) (0.787) (0.900) 
_ -11.000 -15.435* -3.908*** 0.045 
 (12.050) (8.392) (1.143) (0.321) 
EXP -0.049 -0.317*** -0.118*** 0.009 
 (0.060) (0.045) (0.008) (0.009) 
MKTS -0.165 -0.568*** -0.095*** -0.001 
 (0.101) (0.091) (0.021) (0.008) 
     
Observations 3,208 3,059 3,056 2,956 
Log-likelihood\R2 -1701 -3210 0.139 0.030 
Notes: Estimates of an ordered probit regression (columns 1-2) and a regular OLS (columns 3-5) of the 
impact of subsidies on different types of financial constraints: self-assed (column 1); MS index and 
industry weighted MS index (columns 2 and 3, respectively); HH index (column 4). We deliberately omit 
variables that are highly correlated with the measure of constraints by construction (columns 2-5). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 10. Subsidy efficiency: endogenous subsidies. 
Measure Direct MS HH 
Type FC Original Weighted ICFS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUB 0.476*** 0.450*** 0.004 0.015* 
 (0.175) (0.135) (0.028) (0.009) 
SIZE -0.062** -0.128*** -0.013** -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.006) (0.002) 
AGE 0.048 0.045 -0.026*** -0.008 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.007) (0.008) 
PUB_K -0.002 -0.002 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOR_K -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ -0.115 0.392*** 0.021 -0.014 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.018) (0.010) 
CS -1.005***    
 (0.283)    
CF -0.639**    
 (0.317)    
LEV 0.226**   -0.096 
 (0.107)   (0.066) 
ISS -0.356** -0.720*** -0.061** 0.035 
 (0.169) (0.139) (0.027) (0.044) 
∆ 12.542*** -4.359 -0.513 1.431 
 (3.717) (3.548) (0.786) (0.907) 
_ -10.751 -15.537* -3.885*** 0.222 
 (11.981) (8.386) (1.142) (0.342) 
EXP -0.056 -0.307*** -0.118*** -0.003 
 (0.060) (0.051) (0.008) (0.003) 
MKTS -0.179* -0.604*** -0.096*** 0.004 
 (0.101) (0.094) (0.021) (0.007) 
     
 -0.227* -0.251*** -0.041 -0.031* 
 (0.119) (0.090) (0.076) (0.016) 
     
Observations 3,180 3,059 3,056 2,956 
Log-likelihood -2105 -3596 -273.7 -98.13 
Notes: Estimates of simultaneous equations specification (columns 1-2) and treatment effects (columns 3-
5), in line with equations (4) and (5), respectively. We use different measures of financial constraints: 
self-assed (column 1); MS index and industry weighted MS index (columns 2 and 3, respectively); HH 
index (column 4). We deliberately omit variables that are highly correlated with the measure of 
constraints by construction (columns 2-5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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 There are important variables explaining the allocation of subsidies (e.g. size; 
exports) that are not different from what private investors\lenders take into 
consideration when deciding to provide credit. These results may be associated with a 
necessity of public decision makers to show good results of their policies. If this is the 
case, then they will opt for “safer” firms—i.e. those that have a higher probability to 
survive, regardless of the subsidy. However, in such situation, some forms of public 
financial support (notoriously subsidies), may not be that different from the usual 
sources of private external finance. 
 Additionally, as we show in Section 4.3 and contrary to recent evidence (e.g. 
Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012), subsidies might not even reduce financial 
constraints—rejection of hypothesis 2. Our results point towards a certain 
accommodation of subsidy recipient firms, driving a subsidy persistence problem with 
no obvious impact upon the level of constraints. In fact, it is clear that subsidies do not 
mitigate financial constraints. On the contrary, constraints appear to be amplified if a 
firm receives subsidies. This finding suggests that subsides possibly drive the pressure 
from selection forces away, leading to a relative inertia of subsidised firms.  
 The persistence of public funding, that does neither reduces financial constraints 
nor is systematically allocated to unconstrained firms, hints at a possible system failure: 
recipient firms have no incentives to move from public to private funding. It might be 
the case that subsidies have an additionality effect upon R&D investment (not tested in 
this paper). However, the persistence of policy actions that disregard firms’ financial 
constraints may crowd out private finance for R&D and innovation activity in the event 
that financially unconstrained firms dominate the “market for public funds”, drying up 
resources that should be available for constrained firms. The main research question is 
then whether the incremental innovation output of the unconstrained firm is larger than 
the innovation output of the constrained one. Even though such analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it certainly deserves our attention in the future.  
 Furthermore, our results point towards one of two possibilities. Either public 
agencies are not able to screen financially constrained firms, or there are serious 
governance problems that should be dealt with. Therefore, research that analyses the 
detailed subsidy attribution processes is welcomed. Nevertheless, even if these 
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problems in the attribution of subsidies are to be mitigated, our paper shows that this 
policy instrument might prove inadequate to deal with financial constraints.  
 Our analysis is subject to a number of limitations that we briefly address. First, 
our research could be improved if we had information a) on the specific policy 
instruments (criteria and amounts) and b) on the set of firms that were effectively 
interested and applied for the public financial support. 
 Second, our results on the efficiency of subsidies could reflect the fact that a 
priori there is an incorrect allocation of funds. In other words, if unconstrained firms are 
to receive funding, it is not expected that their levels of constraints would diminish. 
Still, while in Section 4.1 we show that a significant number of previously constrained 
(and subsidy recipient) firms continue to face high levels of constraints, our estimates 
from Section 4.3 show that, if significant, the impact of subsidies on constraints would 
be positive. 
 Third, we made a considerable effort, by means of using distinct approaches, to 
rule out biased conclusions due to incorrect measurement of financial constraints. 
Notwithstanding, any currently available measure of constraints may well entail a non-
negligible amount of error. 
 Overall, in this paper we provide robust evidence that allows us to conclude that, 
when it comes to public funding, innovation policy should definitely take into account 
the ability of firms to raise external funds. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyse the nexus between firm’s financial constraints and subsidies to 
innovation. For this purpose we employ different estimation strategies using distinct 
measures of financial constraints. 
 Even though innovation subsidies are generally regarded as having an 
additionality effect upon R&D investment and a positive impact upon innovation, we 
raise serious doubts on their role in alleviating firms’ financial constraints. In particular, 
our results suggest that while on the one hand subsidies are not being correctly allocated 
to those firms more affected by financial constraints, on the other hand, these subsidies 
do not alleviate these constraints.  
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 Finally, our findings have serious implications for future policymaking. Public 
financial support in the form of subsidies does not seem to be particularly effective in 
reducing firms’ financial constraints. Accordingly, rethinking the subsidy attribution 
process and\or redirecting public resources to other strategies to alleviate financial 
constraints to innovate should be given due consideration. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Data sources 
 
 
Table A1. Data sources 
Source Unit Periodicity Time span Target population Sampling scheme Information 
FUE Firm Annually 1996-2004 Portuguese firms Population Firm characteristics 
IEH Firm Annually 1996-2004 Portuguese firms <100 employees: Stratified by location (NUTS II), industry 
(CAE rev 2.1) and firm size (employment). 
 
>99 employees: Population 
Balance sheets 
CIS Firm Waves: 
1997 (II) 
2000 (III) 
2004 (IV) 
Wave span: 
1996-1997 
1998-2000 
2002-2004 
Portuguese firms <250 employees: Stratified by location (NUTS II), industry 
(CAE rev 2.1) and firm size (employment). 
 
>249 employees: Population 
Innovation activity 
Notes: The data is representative at the regional, sectoral and industrial levels, of the Portuguese economy. 
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B. Data 
From the data at our disposal we were able to create the following variables: 
 
B1. Generic information (FUE) 
Age 
(AGE) 
 Computed as the difference between the current year and the year of 
establishment of the firm plus one, in logs;  
Industry 
(CAE) 
 Portuguese industrial classification—using CAE rev 2.1 as reference. 
Different industry codes are converted into dummy indicators; 
Location 
(NUT) 
 European regional classification. Different region codes are converted into 
dummy indicators; 
Public capital 
(PUB_K) 
 Percentage of capital owned by the public sector;  
Foreign capital 
(FOR_K) 
 Percentage of capital owned by non-nationals;  
 
B2. Balance sheets variables (IEH) 
Size 
(SIZE) 
 Measured as log of the number of employees; 
Investment 
(I) 
 Measured as additions to plant, property and equipment- gross investment, 
scaled by total assets; 
Cash- flow 
(CF) 
 Computed as net income before taxes plus depreciation, scaled by total 
assets; 
Cash stock 
(CS) 
 Measured as total cash holdings, scaled by total assets; 
Sales Growth 
(∆) 
 Measured as changes in total sales from previous period; 
Debt and equity issuances
(ISS) 
 Sum of debt and equity issuances, scaled by total assets. For the year 2001 
equity issuances are reported as missing. The reason lies in legal changes 
that took place with the introduction of Euro (most firms adjusted their 
equity, not necessarily meaning issuing equity); 
Non-cash net working 
capital (NWK) 
 Difference between non-cash current assets and current liabilities, scaled by 
total assets; 
Interest payments 
(INT) 
 Interest payments of a firm, scaled by total assets. It can be argued to proxy 
for the credit rating of the firms; 
Leverage 
(LEV) 
 Measured as the ration of liabilities to the total value of a firm; 
Returns on financial 
investments (R_FinI) 
 Returns on financial investments of firms, scaled by assets;  
Intangible assets 
(INTANG) 
 Computed as intangible assets, scaled by total assets. In the absence of a 
better alternative, this variable is intended to proxy the knowledge stock, 
through R&D stock and the patent stock of firms (we do not have detailed 
information neither on patents, nor on highly disaggregated firm accounts); 
Exports 
(EXP) 
 Firm exports, scaled by assets; 
Market share 
(MKTS) 
 This variable is constructed as a firm's sales over total sales of the 
corresponding firm’s industry—at maximum level of industrial classification 
disaggregation (5-digit). 
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B3. Innovation variables (CIS) 
Public Finance 
(SUB) 
 Binary variable for firms that received public funding and those that did not. 
It includes financial support to innovation activities provided by the 
Portuguese local or central administration, as well as by the EU (through the 
“Framework Programs”). This support may take the form of subsidies strictu 
sensu, credit guarantees and tax benefits (from the CIS survey we are not 
able to distinguish them). For the sake of this paper and simplicity we will 
refer it as "subsidies"; 
Share of subsidized firms-
Industry 
(SUB%I) 
 Computed as the ratio of number of subsidized firms in each industry (2-
digit, CAE rev 2.1) to the total number of subsidized firms; 
Share of subsidized firms-
Region 
(SUB%R) 
 Computed as SUB%I but for each region (NUT2). Both of these variables 
serve as instruments for subsidies. The rationale is that, in the absence of 
information on public policy budgets, the share of subsidies by industry and 
region will reflect policy goals for certain industries or regions (see 
Schneider and Veugelers, 2010); 
Cooperation 
(COOP) 
 Binary variable that indicates if a firms cooperated with other firms or 
institutions for the purpose of innovation activities; 
Patent 
(PATENT) 
 Binary indicator of whether a firm registered any patent during the wave 
period. 
R&D workers 
(RD_WORK) 
 Percentage of employers in the firm that work on R&D; 
 
 
 All continuous variables of interest were winsorized at the 1% level (0.5% each 
tail) in order to avoid problems with outliers in the estimation procedures. Deflators 
used include the Industrial Production Price Index and Labour Cost Index, both drawn 
from INE, and the GDP deflator, drawn from the Portuguese Central Bank (BdP). 
Nevertheless, no deflators were used when a variable was constructed as a ratio of two 
nominal values (normalized). In such cases we assume that the price growth rates are 
homogeneous. 
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C. Additional results 
 
Table C1. Subsidy allocation: lagged effect 
Measure Direct MS 
Type 	
 Original Weighted 
 (1) (2) (3) 
	 0.182 0.008 -0.657* 
 (0.208) (0.033) (0.351) 
SIZE 0.112 0.121 0.108 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.078) 
AGE -0.026 0.060 0.017 
 (0.128) (0.122) (0.128) 
FOR_K -0.161 -0.121 -0.125 
 (0.115) (0.104) (0.102) 
RD_WORK 0.155 0.130 0.121 
 (0.103) (0.096) (0.096) 
COOP 0.998*** 0.988*** 1.027*** 
 (0.202) (0.189) (0.190) 
EXP 0.156 0.144 0.100 
 (0.133) (0.131) (0.137) 
SUB%I 11.054*** 10.415*** 10.642*** 
 (1.785) (1.402) (1.456) 
SUB%R -0.011** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
MKTS -0.662 -1.446** -1.630** 
 (0.603) (0.684) (0.710) 
PATENT 0.108 0.162 0.166 
 (0.132) (0.119) (0.120) 
INTANG -0.475 -0.331 -0.331 
 (0.930) (0.802) (0.810) 
    
Observations 557 616 616 
Log-likelihood -93.31 -106.1 -105.2 
Notes: Estimates of a probit regression of subsidies on different types of financial constraints: self-assed 
ordinal variable collapsed into binary (column 1); MS index and industry weighted MS index (columns 2 
and 3, respectively); HH index is dropped because it has no time variability by construction (see Section 
3.1.2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, 
and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table C2. Subsidy efficiency: lagged effect 
Measure Direct MS 
Type FC Original Weighted 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 0.147 0.387*** 0.018 
 (0.124) (0.107) (0.025) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.188*** -0.052*** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.013) 
AGE 0.006 -0.081 -0.043** 
 (0.090) (0.074) (0.021) 
PUB_K -0.003 0.004* 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
FOR_K 0.000 -0.005*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
∆ -0.103 0.066 -0.028 
 (0.221) (0.211) (0.037) 
CS -2.060***   
 (0.644)   
CF -0.917   
 (0.689)   
LEV 0.127   
 (0.231)   
ISS -0.070 -0.281 0.057 
 (0.344) (0.265) (0.056) 
∆ 16.229* 3.275 -1.883 
 (8.774) (7.957) (1.569) 
_ 7.021 -10.695 -3.794** 
 (22.640) (13.048) (1.863) 
EXP -0.234** -0.227*** -0.064*** 
 (0.094) (0.085) (0.015) 
MKTS -0.052 -0.059 -0.060* 
 (0.177) (0.161) (0.036) 
    
Observations 556 595 595 
Log-likelihood\R2 -383.2 -697.7 0.202 
Notes: Estimates of an ordered probit regression (columns 1-2) and a regular OLS (columns 3-5) of the 
impact of subsidies on different types of financial constraints: self-assed (column 1); MS index and 
industry weighted MS index (columns 2 and 3, respectively); HH index is dropped because it has no time 
variability by construction (see Section 3.1.2). We deliberately omit variables that are highly correlated 
with the measure of constraints by construction (columns 2-5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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